8. Perspectives on the governance quality of climate policymaking
of their role in climate policy negotiations, using a Likert scale of 1-5 ('very low' to 'very high') following the indicators of Table 8 .1, thereby generating a score out of 55. Respondents were also invited to make comments underneath the appropriate indicator. Table 8 .2 contains a summary of survey questions.
A number of caveats should be made here regarding the results presented below. The most obvious is that the results constitute the outcomes of a small-n survey only. Clearly the number of employers' organizations responding to and completing the survey is much lower than trade unions, and these results should be seen as largely anecdotal. This is even more so than those who identified as 'other'. In these instances, the numerical values attributed to these responses might appear to have more statistical authority than is actually the case. There are larger numbers of union respondents and therefore the results may be given a little more credence, but again, it must be stressed that given the global numbers of unions worldwide, the results are not broadly representative. The same may be said for the EU and non-EU results. It should be further added that given the size of the trade union cohort, these regional views are also largely influenced by those responses. On this view, the results should be seen as providing an indicative picture that only represents the aggregated perceptions of those who answered the survey. Table 8 .
RESULTS OF THE GOVERNANCE ANALYSIS

Commentary on Results
Some interesting results emerge when all levels of climate policymaking are combined to produce an impression of respondents' perceptions regarding the governance quality of climate policymaking generally. Employers' organizations provided the highest total score (49 per cent; all percentiles are rounded to the nearest whole number). But this was a 'fail' as it did not pass the 50 per cent threshold. At the principle level, 
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Peter J. Glynn, Timothy Cadman and Tek N. Maraseni -9781786430120 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 06/24/2019 08:43:18AM via free access the sector awarded deliberation the highest score overall but participation was a 'fail'. At the criterion level, interest representation, decision-making and implementation received the highest scores overall but organizational responsibility, interest representation and implementation were all 'fails' (although implementation was rated as the highest 'fail' among the three sectors). Democracy was the highest rated indicator overall (3), closely followed by inclusiveness (the second highest indicator), with resources the lowest (1.31). Several indicators did not meet the threshold: transparency (the second weakest indicator) and accountability, which explains the failure of organizational responsibility at the criterion level; and durability and problem-solving, which further explains the failure of implementation as a criterion. The performance of other indicators can only be characterized as 'average', with dispute settlement achieving only a borderline 'pass'. This was not a strong performance and the failure of key governance values such as organizational responsibility and implementation is not a good sign. The only positive intimation is that employers rated the inclusiveness of climate policymaking positively. Those employer organizations that took the survey, while small in number, did not appear confident that current policymaking venues would tackle climate change effectively and they had some serious concerns about transparency and accountability. Trade unions provided the second highest total score -a 'fail' similar to that of employer organizations (also 49 per cent). Both principles were also a 'fail', although participation was the highest scoring 'fail' of the three sectors. Decision-making and organizational responsibility were both a 'pass', with organizational responsibility being the highest scoring criterion; interest representation and implementation did not meet the threshold. It should be noted that were it not for democracy, decisionmaking would otherwise have been a 'fail' at the criterion level. Resources was again the lowest rated indicator (1.86), while democracy was once again the highest (2.74). This sector also 'failed' several indicators, but these were greater in number and different from those of employers: problem-solving (the second lowest indicator), dispute settlement, agreement and equality. The remaining indicators were also 'average'. The results stand in contrast to employers, who gave a lower score to organizational responsibility than unions, who in turn gave a lower score to interest representation: in this regard it should be noted that in addition to the 'fail' for equality, inclusiveness only achieved a borderline 'pass'. This may reveal a difference between the two sectors regarding perceptions of access and influence in policymaking.
The lowest results by far were those from 'other' (31 per cent), but extreme care should be exercised in interpreting these, as the number of respondents was very small. These results are included to acknowledge those who chose to select 'other' as a category of respondent. Everything at the principle, criterion and indicator levels was a 'fail'. As with employers and unions, resources was the lowest indicator (1.25) and the lowest rated overall. Accountability was the highest but still a 'fail' (1.9).
Table 8.4 Commentary on Results
EU respondents provided the highest score for the governance quality of climate policymaking at the national level -the highest score to be achieved across the whole survey (57 per cent). Both principles and all criteria at the national level exceeded the threshold, with all receiving the highest scores. Resources was the lowest rated indicator and a 'fail' (2.32), while accountability was the highest rated indicator overall (3.16). All other indicators were a 'pass', mostly within band '3' range. This is a 'satisfactory' result, perhaps reflecting the fact that policymaking at this level could be perceived as having the greatest likelihood of successful implementation, with clear lines of electoral accountability and parliamentary scrutiny. Additionally, the EU has a history of interest intermediation through various corporatist-style approaches to institutional governance and policymaking (Kjaer, 2015) , which may also have influenced perceptions.
The regional level was second (53 per cent), with both principles and three criteria meeting the threshold; interest representation was a 'fail'. Once again, resources was the lowest rated indicator and a 'fail' (2.06) and accountability the highest (3). Equality was a 'fail' as was inclusiveness (explaining the 'fail' for interest representation). Problem-solving was also a 'fail' and the second lowest indicator. It is tempting to read these results as a reflection on the EU itself as a forum for climate policymaking. If so it might be possible to identify a perception regarding asymmetries of power (perhaps between member states, as well as between sectors). Likewise, it may be that the ability of the EU to successfully reduce emissions also generated a negative attitude; here the problems with the EU ETS, such as the problem of the over-allocation of exemptions reducing demand and keeping the price low, leakage to non-ETS countries, and fraud spring to mind (Branger et al., 2015) .
The intergovernmental level was third and a borderline 'pass' (50 per cent, but only as a consequence of rounding). Participation was a 'fail' at the principle level; likewise interest representation as a criterion. Resources was also the lowest scoring indicator (1.94), and accountability the highest (2.86). Problem-solving, inclusiveness and agreement also received 'fail' ratings; in the case of inclusiveness, contributing to the 'fail' for interest representation -along with equality -at the criterion level. These results could be read as a reflection on the dominance of the nation-states in the high-level policymaking that occurs under UNFCCC. On this view, negative ratings could be interpreted as a perception of exclusiveness and inequality contra member states. 'Other' received the lowest score (39 per cent); both principles were a 'fail', as were all criteria. Resources was also the worst performing indicator, with the lowest 'fail' rating overall (1.33). With the exception of agreement (the highest rated indicator), which was a borderline 'pass', all remaining indicators were a 'fail'. While these results reflect views on a disparate range of policymaking localities, some credence should be given to these perspectives, given the relatively high numbers of respondents (31). In this case, the results would appear indicate a general preference for more state-oriented venues.
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Table 8.5 Commentary on Results
In contrast to those from the EU, the non-EU results demonstrate a preference for the intergovernmental level of climate policymaking but the score was a 'fail' nevertheless (49 per cent). Participation did not meet the threshold, while implementation was the only 'pass' at the criterion level. Resources was the lowest rated 'fail' indicator (1.58) and inclusiveness the highest (2.79). Other indicators that did not meet the threshold were transparency and accountability, as well as dispute settlement and agreement (explaining why their related criteria were both a 'fail'). No respondents rated any indicator at 3 or above at this or any other level. This is another poor performance, especially given the results for transparency, accountability, agreement and dispute settlement (recurring themes across this set of results). The fact that this level received the highest score amongst non-EU respondents may reveal a greater of degree of confidence in intergovernmentalism than other avenues for policymaking, but the results remain unimpressive.
National level policymaking was a close second (also 49 per cent, with rounding), replicating the principle and criterion results of the intergovernmental level, with implementation likewise receiving a (slightly lower) 'pass'. Democracy was the highest rated indicator overall (2.85) and resources the lowest overall (1.54); the other indicators to also receive a 'fail' were accountability (the second lowest indicator for this level) and transparency (explaining the criterion score). Problem-solving was also a 'fail', although behavioural change and durability were a 'pass', thereby resulting in a low 'pass' for the criterion overall. Agreement and dispute settlement did not meet the threshold, also following the intergovernmental results but with a slightly higher score for democracy (the second 
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Peter J. Glynn, Timothy Cadman and Tek N. Maraseni -9781786430120 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 06/24/2019 08:43:18AM via free access highest indicator at this level). Even though decision-making was scored the highest of all the levels, this was not enough to avoid a (borderline) 'fail' -not a very positive sign. However, both democracy and inclusiveness were rated higher than at the intergovernmental level. These results would further appear to demonstrate a lower level of satisfaction regarding the efficacy of national level activities when compared to the EU results, with a lacklustre performance for many aspects of governance. The regional level was the third highest performer (47 per cent). Neither of the principles nor the criteria met the threshold. Resources was again the lowest scoring indicator (1.59) and behavioural change the highest (2.67); democracy was the only other indicator to 'pass'. This is not a good performance and the results appear to show that climate policymaking at the regional level was not perceived especially favourably.
'Other' levels of policymaking generated the lowest scoring results with a 'fail' overall (43 per cent), including both principles and all criteria. Resources was the lowest rated indicator (1.7), while democracy was highest (2.69) and the only indicator to exceed the threshold.
Table 8.6 Commentary on Results
The results from employers' organizations showed the governance of climate policymaking to be highest at the national level (53 per cent). Both principles were the highest scoring overall but participation did not meet the threshold value due to the borderline 'pass' for organizational responsibility and the 'fail' for interest representation. Implementation was the highest scoring criterion overall and, along with decision-making, exceeded the 'pass' threshold. Resources was the lowest rated indicator overall (1.2) and a 'fail' along with transparency. All other indicators were a 'pass', with some positive ratings for inclusiveness, the highest indicator overall (3.38), and also for behavioural change and democracy. This is a relatively sound performance but, on the basis of the rating for transparency and a comparatively weak performance for accountability, it may be possible to infer a general concern regarding the extent to which it respondents deemed it possible to determine what was really going on in domestic-level climate negotiations. This impacts negatively on the degree to which the participation of employers' associations might be determined as being meaningful. Interestingly, the comparatively high rating for inclusiveness offsets the very poor performance of resources, and may demonstrate a perception that employers' organizations felt included in policymaking, even if equality was not rated so highly. Nevertheless, the good results for decision-making and implementation could be interpreted as revealing a degree of confidence in national level processes. The intergovernmental level was a close second (also 53 per cent). As with the national level, participation did not meet threshold, this time on account of a borderline 'fail' for both organizational responsibility and interest representation (which achieved a slightly higher score at this level). Resources was the lowest rated indicator (1.25) and inclusiveness also once again the highest (3.27). Accountability and transparency performed poorly (two 'fails' with the same rating), while all other indicators met the threshold, with the results mirroring those at the national level, albeit slightly lower. Here, the trend regarding accountability and transparency was articulated more strongly with lower ratings. It is possible that perceptions regarding the national (governmental) level have been carried over to the intergovernmental level, where member states on occasion negotiate climate policy behind closed doors and cannot be held to account by their citizenry in this extra-national context. It is worth noting that equality fared slightly better at this level, which, along with inclusiveness, again partially compensates for the low rating for resources.
168
The regional level of policymaking achieved the third highest score (51 per cent) but the difference remained close. The results at both the principle and criterion levels were similar to the intergovernmental level, with participation, interest representation and organizational responsibility receiving a 'fail'. This time decision-making was the highest scoring criterion, and democracy was the highest scoring indicator (3.17). Once again, resources was the lowest 'fail' (1.29). At this level, both transparency and durability failed to meet the threshold. The other indicators were a modest 'pass', with only one other indicator in the '3' band (behavioural change, the second highest rated indicator). These results would appear to confirm the trend regarding issues of organizational responsibility in climate policymaking, although it should be noted that accountability was a 'pass' at this level.
'Other' levels of policymaking received a 'fail' (40 per cent), although the variety of venues (public, private, local, and so on) makes it difficult to draw any firm conclusions. Both principles did not meet the threshold, with the lowest scores overall, nor did any of the criteria (also with the lowest scores overall). For the first and only time across all the results, resources was not the lowest rated indicator; this fell to durability (1.33). Democracy was the only indicator to merit a 'pass', with a relatively good result (3).
Table 8.7 Commentary on Results
The trade union results also delivered the highest score to climate policy at the national level (51 per cent). Both principles met the threshold level and, in the case of participation, achieved the highest score. However, it should be noted that this result for participation was borderline and only just exceeded the 50 per cent threshold. Three criteria were a 'pass', with decision-making and organizational responsibility also receiving the highest scores at the criterion level (organizational responsibility was scored equally highly at the intergovernmental level). However, it should be noted that while a 'pass', these results are not a resounding endorsement of the transparency and accountability of policymaking, nor related decision-making. Interest was representation received 'fail', albeit the highest scoring 'fail'. Resources was again the lowest indicator (1.92) and inclusiveness and democracy the highest (2.83). Democracy enabled the criterion of decision-making to exceed the threshold, but it should be noted that both agreement and dispute settlement were a 'fail', as was problem-solving (the lowest rating at this level of policymaking). These results are moderately satisfactory but not impressive, and are slightly lower than those from employers, although it is interesting to see a higher score for transparency. In further contrast, the low ratings for agreement and dispute settlement are to be considered. Like employers, the intergovernmental level of policymaking was the next best performer; however, it was still only a borderline 'pass' (50 per cent). At the principle level, deliberation met the threshold, with the highest result, while participation did not. Three criteria met the threshold but interest representation was a 'fail' -a stark contrast to employers. Resources was the lowest rated indicator (1.9) and durability the highest (2.81). Four other indicators were a 'pass': democracy (the second highest rating), behavioural change, accountability and transparency. In the case of decision-making, it was only the comparatively high score of democracy that prevented this criterion from failing to meet the threshold, as both agreement and dispute settlement were a 'fail'. Problem-solving was also a 'fail'. These results are not a ringing endorsement of intergovernmental policymaking.
Regional level policymaking was third, but with slightly worse results than the intergovernmental level (50 per cent). Similarly, deliberation met the threshold at the principle level while participation did not. Three criteria also met the threshold, with interest representation the 'fail'. Resources was the lowest rated indicator and a 'fail' (1.94), with democracy the highest 'pass' (2.8). Other indicators to meet the threshold were behavioural change (the second highest indicator), followed by transparency, durability, accountability, agreement and inclusiveness (in this case, on the borderline). However, the 'fail' for equality, and the borderline 'pass' for inclusiveness might appear to indicate a negative perception about interest representation.
'Other' was the least performing level of policymaking activity (44 per cent) but the previous caveats about the disparate nature of this category need to be restated. Neither deliberation nor participation met the threshold, nor did any criteria: these were all the lowest results overall. Resources was also the lowest rated indicator overall and a 'fail' (1.67), Democracy was the highest 'pass' (2.59), with agreement the only other (borderline) 'pass'; all other indicators did not meet the threshold. After resources, behavioural change and problem-solving were the second lowest scoring indicators overall (2), perhaps a reflection of the fact that respondents' thought that governmental processes (ought to) have a greater ability to implement climate policy.
OBSERVATIONS ON THE GOVERNANCE ANALYSIS FROM SURVEY RESPONDENTS
Commentary from Employers
Given the number of respondents, only a few comments were offered. In relation to inclusiveness, one respondent questioned whether governments were prepared 'to commit to climate change policies', while another was of the view that those interests who wanted to introduce new initiatives were 'often overlooked' because they were seen as being 'outside mainstream thinking'. For this respondent, there was a knock-on effect in terms of equality, because it meant that if a particular initiative was not 'mainstream' it was 'not rated as important'. Two further respondents commented briefly on resources. One noted that in terms of support from climate policymaking forums they received 'actually, none'. Another respondent commented that they did 'not expect any contribution'. Two further respondents provided comments on transparency, both of which were negative. One believed that transparency lost out to those issues that were 'politicized', consequently 'fact gets lost in the process'. Another respondent commented that the policymaking they had been involved in was 'not transparent'. They felt that their presence 'was just to fulfill [a] requirement'. In terms of dispute settlement, this same respondent considered that is was the 'people in authority' who had the 'greater say'. This led them to conclude that as far as problem-solving was concerned, 'policy decision-makers are not interested'.
Commentary from Unions
With larger numbers of respondents, there were correspondingly more comments from this sector. For inclusiveness, comments fell into three main categories: the extent to which unions were or were not included in formal policymaking processes; the difficulties experienced in trying to get climate change issues recognized inside and outside the labour movement; and what the broader contribution of unions to climate-related policymaking should be. In terms of being included in governmental processes, one respondent commented that they had 'no formal role at any level', despite the fact that their union had 'participated in community level climate change engagement at the local, State and (to a limited extent) national level'. Another respondent complained that:
Organized labour and NGOs have struggled to get Just Transition or even human rights impacts in the language of UNFCCC documents. We have a toehold in the COP21 Paris Agreement. At the national level we have been a significant contributor to climate policy of the [previous government], but still have to struggle there. With the [current government], it is mostly a closed door for unions.
Concerning the extent to which unions were included in climate change issues, one respondent noted that there was generally only a 'low recognition of the relevance of trade unions outside of those covering directly impacted workers (for example, coal and energy)'. Their union included 'climate scientists' in particular, but despite this they had found it necessary 'to continually assert our relevance and informed contributions'. They had found that 'the issue for us is with government, business and NGOs as well as other unions'. Another respondent from a national union described how climate issues were handled internally, explaining that local branches 'undertake their own activities to varying degrees, our larger branches engage more directly with members by holding annual conferences on climate change'. One union member commented that they did 'not feel involved in any climate policy decisions. The only participation is my own commitment to change the policy in my home and work offices'. With regard to the role of CSOSs, one respondent thought that: 'more formal engagement with unions and civil society is needed at national level'. Another respondent echoed this sentiment, pointing to the 'need for more public awareness that would ensure that decisions are implemented and monitored'.
In commenting on issues of equality, there were a few observations about the bias of policy negotiations. Although, as one respondent put it, 'all participants are treated with respect' they were aware that 'commercial and political interests skew attitudes'. Another was more frank, suggesting that processes were 'dominated by single-issue pressure groups with a contempt for working people'. A third respondent, reflecting a similar view recognized that 'as a trade union, we are not a negotiating party. Given that, the parties (to the treaty) tend to listen most to those shouting the loudest -often business lobbies'. Another respondent from a climate vulnerable country saw the problems that can arise from unequal treatment of unions in society:
The importance of public sector unions' participation is recognized by certain bodies. Nonetheless, such recognition is wanting in other strategic bodies that tackle matters concerning climate change, disaster risk reduction and management [DRRM] and the like. For instance, in the drafting of the [national] DRRM Plan, public sector unions were not represented. This matter is highly important since distinct inputs can be contributed by the public sector union not only because of the involvement and responsibility of its members in matters of public services but also because most often than not, these same members are themselves victims of disasters and/or the consequences of climate change. Union participation at all levels should be advanced.
Lastly, one union representative expressed concern about the unequal treatment given to different policy-related impacts of climate change, notably, given the topic of this book, on workforce issues:
Everyone says something about jobs, but no one integrates labour structural adjustment into their climate policies and programs. We have rhetoric without substance from most players -from industry through all major parties to green groups.
Issues around resourcing attracted a number of responses, which can be broadly divided into three topics: observations about the lack of resources to participate in climate-related policy; how different unions responded to this lack; and, by way of contrast, commentary on the resources that other sectors had at their disposal. Several respondents commented that as trade unions, they did not receive any external funding for their participation, as one noted 'in COPs or for our other activities on climate'. Another explained that their union did not receive 'any external resources for climate change activity'. One respondent provided some historical context: I don't think unions in [country] have ever received [money] for any work on climate policy or programs or to participate in any event. Way back in the 1989-92 period the [government agency] did provide travel costs to unions for participation, but nothing to fund policy development, while green groups got hundreds of thousands of dollars. The most assistance that has ever been given at international level is the rare inclusion of unions (alongside industry and green groups) in government delegations to UNFCCC events where NGO access was highly restricted.
Sources of income for participation varied. One union member explained that they were 'expected to self-fund' while another complained that they were 'always expected to pay up -and support member participation and also help out NGOs'. Some respondents explained that their sources of income for participation were derived 'internally' and, as another explained, 'we finance all our activities on our own funds (workers' fees)'. The organizer of an environmental action group within their own union explained that this was 'a member driven group and as such attracts no allocated funding or administrative support. It is facilitated in my role as Vice President, and I manage the requirements within my own resource boundaries'. Another respondent commented on the resources for government agencies in comparison to civil society, and made some suggestions:
Government representatives participating in discussions/forum/workshops and like sessions are fully funded by government. On the other hand, trade unions have to shoulder costs. Hence, if resources are limited and/or the activity [is] not covered by the approved program of action of the union it is most likely that participation is also constrained. Recognising the importance of trade union inputs, mechanisms should be in place to allow a fully sponsored participation. After all, each government agency has its distinct programs, fully funded, from which such full sponsorship can be sourced.
In providing comments on matters of accountability, it was interesting to see that two respondents contrasted the UNFCCC negotiations favourably in comparison to international trade negotiations. One noted that UNFCCC did 'at least provide for civil society presence and input', while the second respondent was of the view that in comparing the two, 'climate negotiations are transparent, pluralistic, open and democratic'. But this same respondent was 'not convinced that trade negotiations might really constitute a standard, though'. At the national level, the trade union representative from a climate-vulnerable country and who had previously commented on their country's DRRM plan, linked it to accountability:
The Plan is there, but is there a tool to monitor if indicators are achieved and/or who are the persons/offices responsible? Sadly, there is none. Hence, the urgency for the drafting of a monitoring tool that will also indicate responsible offices/ persons as a clear way of pinpointing accountability. The trade union however, as earlier mentioned, was not given the opportunity to sit in the drafting of the plan. In the [confederated trade union] bodies where [this respondent's union] sits, inputs are utilized as part of the policy/action recommendations, which these bodies consistently push and campaign for.
Given the strong conceptual linkages to accountability, several of those respondents who commented on transparency referred back to the previous question. Two further comments were offered. One union member thought that the transparency of climate policymaking at the national level was 'reasonable' but indicated that because the level of participation afforded to them by their national government was 'low', their ability to comment was 'limited'. One final respondent, discussing the nature of policymaking, felt that 'there is always an agenda by those that run the conferences'.
Three respondents commented on issues relating to democracy. On a national level, the first was of the view that their government was not 'very interested in climate change policy and has until recently been winding climate policy back'. In the light of recent developments, they thought this was 'now being partially rectified, however progress is insanely slow. Climate change policy seems quite separate to any democratic processes in place at the national level'. Two respondents active at multiple levels, including at the intergovernmental level, questioned the democratic legitimacy of states active within the climate regime. One observed that:
UNFCCC and other intergovernmental processes are democracy of a kind. The UNFCCC requires consensus of all parties -which gives equal weighting to the population of China and Tuvalu! . . . However, it is pretty clear that governments listen to banks, mining companies and other big business more than civil society.
The third also wondered how much negotiating parties took the views of their citizenry into account, reflecting that: 'democracy refers to the people. Parties to the treaty are states. Do states' or nations' positions really reflect people's interests in a faithful manner?'
Comments on the effectiveness of agreements within climate policy ranged from observations about internal union processes and community level activities as well as national and international processes. Internally, one respondent active on environmental issues contended that within their union the 'process of policy formulation, consideration and adoption was transparent, inclusive and democratic'. A further respondent linked their own union's internal processes to the making of broader trade union policy, noting that: 'while resolution/s can be used to express the overall perspective and collective position of participating organizations/ bodies, there is still a need to cascade such position up [sic] to the grassroots for wider support'. Another thought that the community action had proven to be one of the most effective avenues for climate action and that 'community voices, coordinated through groups such as 350.org, appear to have impacted the negotiations, however, our country as a whole has provided little if any avenues for contribution to the public debate'. In making the link between union policy and government, one respondent questioned which was more effective, given that:
The government has the ear of climate change deniers. We wonder if there is a genuine desire to address climate change policy or is it a token gesture . . . our own effectiveness is related to [country] branches communicating with members about climate change, and finding out what is going on [in the union branches] and initiatives our members make in their workplaces.
Looking at the intergovernmental level, one of two respondents thought that the 'UNFCCC talks do not advance fast enough to counter climate change', while the second considered that the 'UNFCCC approach is the broadest, but it is clear that major progress will depend on agreement between the largest countries and largest emitters (roughly the same group)'. This respondent pointed to the importance of other forums, 'like US-China deals, the Major Economies Forum and the G20'. At the national level, they thought climate policy had become 'highly polarized' and made a plea for 'climate policy to become bipartisan to provide certainty over a period of decades'.
In relation to dispute settlement, respondents were either unaware of specific disputes, or had negative perspectives. One was of the view that 'avoidance of areas of dispute seems the usual way out -and then finding lowest common ground'. Another, who commented previously about their national government's hostility to action on climate change, believed that 'the whole question is still in dispute, especially within the current government, and even within the opposition in terms of being politically committed to take meaningful action'. One of the intergovernmental level commentators made the pertinent observation that 'the UNFCCC process does not really have dispute settlement or enforcement mechanisms. In fact the process of target-setting involves each country nominating its own targets unilaterally'. In their own country, this respondent thought climate policy 'has been a battlefield with little dispute resolution'.
Views on the likelihood of climate policy changing the behaviours that have contributed to historical anthropogenic emissions were both varied and nuanced. One respondent stated that they were 'always confident that exposure to the debates and informed discussion changes behaviours', a view shared by another who believed that 'awareness raising' had 'provided a platform to base future action upon'. A third respondent agreed, with the proviso that 'if able to be involved, I believe I can change behaviour'. A further respondent was less optimistic, thinking that the chances of changing behaviour were 'very doubtful', but they did think it might be possible if their national confederation of trade unions were to 'take climate change on, on behalf of their affiliates (our union being one) in a big way'. Another respondent expanded on the mechanics of gaining such traction at the confederated trade union level. They had a body in their country that brought a range of different unions together to develop common positions but in order to 'achieve its fruits' it needed 'tangible follow-through programs for policies'. They thought that the 'incorporation of policy recommendations . . . should be harmonized and complemented' with other climate-related programmes. They had confidence behavioural change could be 'gotten and reinforced with the right mechanisms, not solely through policy negotiations. And it is something that the government, the private sector and trade unions can jointly work for'. Finally, one of the union representatives active internationally and nationally considered that globally there is 'momentum building for action, but the question is whether the pace will ever be enough . . . At the national level, government policy has tended to lag behaviour change, though the picture is murky'. They pointed to the fiscal instruments and incentives developed by government to encourage solar uptake, but they concluded that at this point, it was now 'market economics and climate awareness that is doing more of the work'.
Respondents' views were similarly varied on the extent which climate policies would actually solve the problem of climate change. One thought there was 'lots of politics, lots of lobbying' leading to actions that, according to a second respondent, were 'largely symbolic'. A third respondent commented along similar lines that: 'while there is satisfaction in talking and settling upon conservative outcomes, little will change'. A fourth respondent believed that with their country 'being a signatory to the Paris Agreement is as close as it's come'. But they also thought 'the action, which should follow, is not evident' and that 'the political cycle is one of the barriers to ongoing commitment and follow through action'. One final respondent summed up the possibilities:
There will be progress towards 'solving' climate change, but it is an open question as to whether the pace will be enough. It seems pretty clear that there will be an overshoot in terms of emissions not reducing fast enough to proven warming above 2 degrees, but the solutions to reduce emissions more rapidly may occur and be deployed.
In their comments on durability, one respondent thought this was 'the key issue'. They explained that their 'interventions have been in the national political processes focused upon legislation and government policy' but 'durability is just not there, as there is not a consensus or way to get there yet'. Noting the need for flexibility and adaptability, a further respondent made the logical point from an organized labour perspective that 'as for all policies, there will be a review, at which time the stance may be altered depending on current membership views'. This was because, according to a second respondent, 'the perspective and priority of the current leadership also matters'. Another respondent made the insightful observation that 'the whole debate has been going on for over 20 years, so it's had longevity, but not resilience, flexibility, or adaptability'. This perspective was reflected by one of the union representatives active at the international and national levels. They concluded that 'durability is improving at the UNFCCC level' but that nationally there needed to be 'a complete revamp of climate policy and politics'.
Commentary from Other Respondents
Other respondents also made some useful contributions about the governance of climate policymaking. Concerning inclusiveness, one respondent who is active in the area of 'civic education' felt that 'negotiations seem limited to a handful of 'special' players'. This view was shared by another respondent who had 'attended one policy think tank organized by a government department' but considered that it had been 'farcical'. A third respondent commented on inclusiveness and suggested that policymaking 'should include those most impacted, be diverse and include the voices of those who bear the brunt of climate change', also adding that such forums should 'be linked to anti austerity, anti-racist, anti-fascist and migrant rights' discussions and campaigns'. The final respondent to comment thought 'access to consultations' through avenues such as municipal/ mayoral planning had afforded them 'no real role in either policymaking, or formally holding bodies to account'. No one commented on issues of equality, but regarding resources this same respondent felt that their government was 'specifically excluding' stakeholders by 'strictly limiting resources -for example travel and subsistence to attend meetings' meaning it was necessary for them to 'fund their own way'. This same respondent commented on both accountability and transparency at the national level, noting in terms of the former that: '"what is said in the room stays in the room" is a key principle, and if you exclude those who may challenge you from the room, then there is limited accountability'. Concerning transparency, they went on to add that they were 'especially unable to get at information as to what happens when the government fails to meet legally set EU pollution standards'. This led them to conclude that this was a strategy to allow government to 'negotiate around these [standards] in confidence'. They also questioned the democratic nature of climate-related decision-making in their country, making the observation that 'even in its broadest sense there is little accountability'. They did not consider any of the agreements made to be especially effective because 'outcomes are obscure and rarely policed. Fines are rarely imposed. Targets [are] never met and budgets for greater sustainability rarely, if ever, adapted to facilitate the changes'. As far as dispute settlement was concerned, they made the point that they 'never' got to participate in disputes because their country did not 'follow the social partnership model, and the institutions that do nominate up to the EU' did not 'engage downwards' to stakeholders on 'environmental issues'.
Two respondents provided observations on matters around implementation. In terms of the impacts of climate policy on changing behaviour one respondent was pessimistic, commenting that: 'the exclusive nature of the negotiations and the reasons for this -putting vested political and capital interest first -excludes confidence in genuine change'. The second noted that this was 'entirely dependent on the extent of adoption of the policy that has been put in place'. They pointed to recent developments by some companies to disclose their climate-related activities at annual general meetings and added that the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) 'has stated that if widely adopted, it would be a game changer in driving corporate change in relation to climate change'. Both commented on the capacity of policymaking to solve the problem of climate change. The first made the point that 'intergovernmental and regional policies cannot work without regulation and enforcement, and the same bodies are unwilling and or unable to police themselves'. In relation to both problem-solving and durability, the second respondent reiterated their previous comments about the need to first formulate policy and then adopt it.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
The results from employers' organizations were modest. However, it might be concluded that they demonstrate a general satisfaction concerning interest representation at the national, intergovernmental and regional levels but dissatisfaction with transparency and, to a certain extent, accountability. Clearly, there were poor ratings for resources. This is perhaps not surprising in view of the fact that many decision-making venues do not resource stakeholders to attend (or restrict resourcing to developing country participants, for example). By nature, organizations such as employers' associations represent others and are often afforded the capacity to do so by their members (through, for example, fees and subscriptions). But this may not be the case for some (such as those in less developed countries). In the case of other comparative studies of UNFCCC-related initiatives (REDD+, CDM) undertaken by the researchers, resources have also been consistently the lowest rated indicator (Cadman et al., 2016; Maraseni and Cadman, 2015) . It would be expected that employers' organizations might have the economic capacity to attend meetings themselves but there are other kinds of resources, such as the provision of technical or institutional support, that may be absent. If so, the responsibility is on the institutions developing climate policy to provide these. What is clear in the results is that climate policymaking was not rated as particularly transparent at any level, and there were reservations about accountability at the intergovernmental level as well. As UNFCCC is arguably the most important climate policymaking venue of all, this is of concern. Given the number of respondents, care should be exercised in viewing these results as a definitive expression of employers' views, however the trends are certainly interesting.
Trade unions were really only satisfied with policymaking at the national level but even here there were problems. Problem-solving and dispute settlement were consistent 'fails', while equality and inclusiveness were not especially high performers; nor was agreement. Particular attention should be given to interest representation, which did not meet the threshold at any level and stands in contrast to the employer results. While the numbers of unions responding are not large given the total global labour movement, the results could nevertheless be seen as being at least partially indicative of this sector's perspectives on the governance quality of climate-change related policy. Trade union respondents appear to feel excluded from policymaking at the intergovernmental level and have issues regarding their equality of treatment.
EU respondents viewed their role in policymaking at both the national and regional level positively, but issues around equality and problemsolving were recurring themes at the intergovernmental and regional levels. The relatively high ratings for both accountability and transparency are also favourable, but it should be noted that resources was also identified as a problem at all levels of policymaking. The low results for the governance quality of policymaking at the intergovernmental level, which may be connected to a perceived lack of interest representation, should be of concern. Nevertheless, on the basis of the results, the conclusion might be drawn that these respondents viewed their membership of the EU as making a positive contribution to their involvement in the governance of climaterelated policymaking.
This was not the case for respondents outside the EU, and those results show a far less positive attitude regarding involvement in climate policymaking. There were some mitigating factors. Inclusiveness and equality were rated favourably at the intergovernmental and national levels, as was durability, and behavioural change was a 'pass' at the intergovernmental, national and regional levels. These latter two results may demonstrate that the implementation of climate policy was perceived as having some impact on reducing emissions, even if this was not that successful in solving the broader problem of climate change. However, there were also significant weaknesses at all levels. Accountability and transparency were seen as lacking at all levels, which is deeply concerning. Democracy fared comparatively better being the only indicator to 'pass' at all levels of policymaking, but this was offset by the fact that both agreement and dispute settlement were also universal underperformers. The other negative message was that respondents were clearly of the view that policymaking institutions did not provide sufficient resources to assist in their participation in policymaking.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the survey. There appears to be more confidence in climate policymaking at the national level than via UNFCCC. This is partially related to concerns around access and influence, and accountability and transparency, which are more readily addressed at the ballot box than at the global climate talks if stakeholders are dissatisfied. Greater emphasis must be placed on transparency of the climate talks themselves, not just about transparency in relation to countries reporting on their emissions reduction activities or which country has given how much money to which other country or initiative (Decisions 85-99 of the Paris Agreement). COP 21 in Paris was heavily criticized by CSOs, who argued 'negotiating behind closed doors undermines the ability of civil society to ensure the accountability of governments and the UNFCCC process ' (ECO, 2015) .
But equally important, if not more so, is this extent to which the availability of resources for CSOs at the intergovernmental level impacts their ability to represent their interests effectively. Participation in international policymaking is expensive, given the costs of travel and accommodation. Effort has been put in at the climate talks to provide wireless Internet and there are some opportunities for getting hold of hard copies of negotiating text. However, it is undeniable that there is much better support for member states that are parties to the Convention than CSOs. Given the significance that the Paris Agreement places on the role of 'non-Party stakeholders', as they are referred to , and the commitment to capacity building within the text (Decisions 72-84), it is vital that better provisions are made (in the texts of future agreements, if necessary) to allocate more resources to CSOs to attend negotiations, not just Parties. It is speculation, but possible, that unions may feel more excluded at the intergovernmental level than business interests because their capacity to attend is more constrained. It should be emphasized here that the survey question referred to the extent to which policymaking forums provided resources to survey respondents. Here, there is clearly a deficit and, in the case of unions at the very least, and most likely for other sectors as well, there is a need for greater allocation of resources by policymaking forums for CSOs to attend. Given the comparatively low numbers of trade union representatives in climate negotiations historically (consistently less than 1 per cent of registered attendees over time), it is possible that TUNGOs are losing out compared to ENGOs or BINGOs (15 per cent and 9 per cent respectively); this might explain the contention (Cabré, 2011) that sectors such as business and environmental interests 'continue to dominate civil society participation at UNFCCC events ' (p. 20) . In this case, providing resources for under-represented sectors is even more important.
In addition to this, it must be reiterated that CSOs are often deliberately excluded from intergovernmental negotiations, with a consequential impact on both transparency (since it is not possible for them to determine if their views are being represented) and accountability (since Parties cannot be held to account for any misrepresentation that might occur). Interestingly, it appears that it is not the case that non-state actor participation 'clutters up' the negotiating space, thereby undermining efficiency. Rather it is the political dynamics, and historical institutional factors that lead to negotiations behind closed doors, and ironically, not the sensitivity of particular agenda items (Nasiritousi and Linnér, 2016) . If this is the case, governmental Parties need to yield political space to other actors and the UNFCCC needs to increase institutional efforts to develop better modes of multi-stakeholder participation.
